

Enterprise Risk Management/ Enterprise Risk Management Committee Meeting Agenda January 26, 2007, 2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. Board Room, One Market

ERM Committee Members

Standing Guests

Peter A. Darbee Kent M. Harvey* Christopher P. Johns Thomas B. King Bill T. Morrow Hyun Park Hudson Martin, Director, Enterprise Risk Management and Insurance, PG&E Corporation

Jon Frisch, Principal Risk Manager, Enterprise Risk Management and Insurance, PG&E

Corporation

*Committee Chair

Invited Guests

Jeff Butler, Senior Vice President, Energy Delivery, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Roy Kuga, Vice President Energy Supply, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Fong Wan, Vice President, Energy Procurement, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Lise Jordan, Director, Resource Strategy and Initiative Management, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Todd Strauss, Senior Director, Energy Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Martin Wyspianski, Associate, Renewable Supply, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Order</u>	<u>Presenters</u>	
2:00 p.m.	ERM status update	1	Hudson Martin	Information only
2:05 p.m.	Gas and Electric Transmission and Distribution System Safety	2	Jeff Butler Lise Jordan	Information only
	- ,	*	and Dr. Frisch leave the ad Mr. Wyspianski enter the	C
3:00 p.m.	Natural Gas Supply	3	Fong Wan	Information only
•	(Executive Session)		Todd Strauss	-
			Martin Wyspiansk	



Enterprise Risk Management

Gas and Electric Transmission and Distribution System Safety Risk Review

January 26, 2007

Contents



- Risk Definition, Scope and Key Assumptions
- Impact Analysis
- Interrelated Risks
- Risk Ownership and Responsibility
- Risk Families and Drivers
- Gap Assessment Process and Current Risk Management Activities
- Additional Planned Risk Management Activities
 - Gas Transmission and Distribution (T&D)
 - Electric T&D
 - Emergency Response
 - Key Information Sources

Risk Definition



A **system condition** that PG&E knows, or should reasonably know, could cause a **hazardous event**, but does not take expeditious or sufficient action to mitigate that risk.

System condition: Any condition associated with gas or electric transmission and distribution (T&D) facilities that poses a threat to public/employee safety.

Hazardous Event: Includes events that pose significant safety risk to employees and the public e.g., fire/explosion, and health threats e.g., environmental incidents, asphyxiation, or electrocution.

Risk Scope



In scope:

All gas and electric transmission, distribution, substation and regulating facilities including:

- Design, procurement, construction, maintenance and emergency response
- Operating practices and procedures
- Risks identified through experience (events) and key sources of information
- Risks identified by other utilities
- Risks identified by regulatory agencies

Out of scope:

- Unforeseeable events that are externally caused and outside our control.
- All natural hazards, with the exception of seismic. Consideration of seismic risk is limited to the adequacy of design of T&D assets.

Impact Analysis



- Financial exposure from \$100 million \$500 million and/or
- Significant injury, illness or environmental impact and/or
- ◆ National or international attention resulting in a severe negative consequence to the Company's image or reputation with regulators, customers, or general public as a result of regional attention.

Interrelated Risks



- Cover-up
- Disaster Recovery/Business Continuity Plan
- Electric Distribution System
- Electric Transmission System
- Environmental
- Natural Hazards other than Earthquakes
- Political/Regulatory Environment
- Seismic
- Urban Wildland Fire

Risk Ownership and Responsibility



Risk Owner	Supporting Officers	Risk Manager	Analysis Team
Jeff Butler	Stewart Ramsay	Lise Jordan	Rebecca Hardie
			Rich Kauzer
			Orville Plum
			Charlie Poston
			Ken Pritten
			Mark Sweeney
			Chris Warner

Risk Families



- Gas T&D
- ◆ Electric T&D
- Emergency Response
- ◆ Key Information Sources*

^{*} Internal/External sources of data relevant to potential risks associated with the Gas & Electric Transmission & Distribution systems.

Risk Drivers - Gas T&D



- Operations or Maintenance
 - operations or controller error results in over-pressurization of a low-pressure system
- Design
 - Engineering/Operations' technical expertise is inadequate due to loss of institutional knowledge
- Material and Equipment
 - weld seam failure in a high consequence area
- Construction
 - fatalities due to a PG&E service line directionally drilled through an existing sewer
- Corrosion
 - internal corrosion rupture on a local transmission line in a high consequence area
- Excavation Damage
 - mis-marked facilities cause a dig-in fatality
- Ground Movement
 - response or preparedness for a significant seismic event is inadequate
- Other Outside Force
 - over-pressurization caused by vandalism at facility with inadequate security
- Management Decisions
 - program commitments are not fulfilled
- Gas Quality
 - composition or contamination impacts facilities or customers

Risk Drivers - Electric



- Operations or Maintenance
 - deteriorated crossarm breaks, causing energized conductor to fall
- ◆ Design
 - connector used in non-recommended application fails, causing energized conductor to fall
- Material and Equipment
 - malfunctioning pressure relief valves on subsurface transformers leads to catastrophic failure
- ◆ Construction
 - non-conformance to standards or poor workmanship causes incident
- Ground Movement
 - unrestrained equipment in substation causes an extended outage
- Other Outside Force
 - repeated car-pole accidents at the same location
- Management Decisions
 - program commitments are not fulfilled

Risk Drivers – Emergency Response



Lack of Available Response Personnel

 personnel do not sign up for emergency call-out, unable to contact personnel on call-out list, or personnel refuse to work

Failure of Technology

 failed SCADA communication delays response, or radios don't work due to the impact of adverse weather conditions on repeaters

Lack of Emergency Planning

 emergency response plans not in place, personnel not trained on, or unfamiliar with, emergency response responsibilities, or contact information with outside agencies is out of date.

Access to Trouble Locations

 police prevent emergency response personnel from having access into an area, wildland fire prevents access to substations, or landslides and fallen trees block roadway.

Risk Drivers - Key Information Sources



Internal/Operations

 employee fails to complete a near miss report while using approved work procedure, thereby leaving risk unmitigated

Law/Claims

 several claims or suits are filed relating to a particular hazardous condition but the information is not analyzed, trended, tracked or disseminated to operations for mitigation

Regulatory

 supervisor fails to implement required safety reporting procedures after employee fatality due to fall from tower

Employee

 an employee has first-hand knowledge of a condition that poses a risk to employees and the public but does not report the issue

Public


 customer calls in a hazardous condition, but information is improperly analyzed and sent to the wrong organization

Industry

 the manufacturer of equipment provides an operating and maintenance manual to the company but there is no internal control for document retention and distribution of information thereby resulting in a hazardous condition; failure to properly install and maintain the equipment

Gap Assessment Process





Six questions asked to determine effectiveness of key mitigation efforts and information sources

- •Documented process?
- •Event evaluation/analysis?
- •Event trending?
- •Disseminated to operations?
- •Process tracked?
- •Process regularly re-evaluated?

Two Key Revelations From Risk Analysis



- Analyzing how PG&E processes Key Information Sources is extremely valuable to mitigate system risks
- ◆ To mitigate the gas and electric T&D risks identified in this assessment, we need to apply our Internal Audit and Quality Assurance efforts to those processes we rely on.

Context



◆ PG&E manages its gas and electric transmission and distribution systems through the application of multiple programs and processes. In many instances, those programs and processes exceed industry standards. The focus of this risk assessment was to identify the processes we rely on to manage our systems, and evaluate the effectiveness of those processes. The analysis was performed by a small group of subject matter experts. This analysis and the results require further validation and review prior to the development of a course of action.

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Overview



- Most additional planned activities fit into one of ten categories:
 - Data management, trending and sharing
 - Enhanced or improved training
 - Improved oversight
 - Improved cooperation between departments
 - Emergency plans and drills
 - Enhanced communication efforts
 - Modified documentation
 - Modified work methods
 - Addressing non-compliance
 - Enhanced staffing/staffing scheduling
- ◆ A work plan will be established in 1Q 2007 to establish target dates and budget estimates for planned activities

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Risk Families – Gas and Electric T&D



Risk Drivers	Potential Gaps	Potential Activities
Design and Excavation Damage	Overall analysis of possible failure modes and hazards for equipment may be inadequate Examples: • Catastrophic equipment failure in high density areas • Multiple car pole incidents at the same location • Contribution of mark and locate equipment limitations to dig in frequency	 Reduce Design and Excavation Damage risk by: Developing a comprehensive Failure Modes Effects Analysis program for equipment failures and incidents that will guide work procedure modifications, equipment replacement, inspections and audits Developing asset registry to capture critical information for analysis and trending (e.g. location history files, historic data of manufacturer's equipment maintenance recommendations) Developing a process to trend, analyze failures/incidents and take action to address high risk issues.

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Risk Families – Gas and Electric T&D (2)



Risk Drivers	Potential Gaps	Potential Activities
Maintenance and Management Decisions	Incomplete follow through on recommendations or program commitments	Manage full completion of recommendations and programs by:
Decisions	 Indoor substation fire protection program Deteriorated / damaged assets leading to public shock hazard: Bare secondary wire Gas meter protection 	 Developing database for tracking program recommendations, scope and regulatory commitments Monitoring scope and progress Documenting concurrence of all scope or schedule changes

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Risk Families – Gas and Electric T&D (3)



Risk Drivers	Potential Gaps	Potential Activities
Construction and Maintenance	Actual practices may not comply with existing standards and process requirements Examples: • Lack of maintenance and timely de-energizing of idle lines could result in electric contact • Gas service bored through sewer/storm drain laterals	 Supporting on-going Compliance Risk Assessment and ensure follow through with recommendations Monitoring implementation of new/high risk standard requirements Performing QA audits on high risk standard/process requirements Reducing complexity of standards Educating maintenance and construction personnel by re-enforcing high risk standards/process requirements and testing for understanding

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Risk Families – Emergency Response



Risk Drivers	Potential Gaps	Potential Activities					
Lack of Response Personnel	PG&E personnel unavailability for emergency response may increase damages and public safety risk Examples: • Personnel may not be available to take emergency calls from public agency and customers • Personnel may not be available to respond to safety hazard	 Increase the coverage of field personnel in locations where operational and emergency response needs have been identified. Increase staffing on swing/grave yard and weekend shifts. Increase the deployment of SCADA technology to give further control of the gas and electric systems to existing 24x7x365 control center personnel (gas & electric). Change Union contractual agreements to modify and enhance the current call-out requirements/obligations 					
Lack of Emergency Planning	Emergency plans may not exist or may not be sufficiently comprehensive Examples: Inadequate coordination with local agencies to ensure adequate access to trouble locations There may be no response plans to some types of emergency events	Enhance emergency plans Continue to work with local emergency agencies (local OES's, police, fire departments, etc.)					

Additional Planned Risk Management Activities Risk Families - Key Information Sources



Risk Drivers	Potential Gaps Sources with ineffective or partial processes but high value potential	Potential Activities
Internal/Operations	 Construction Standards/Feedback Loop Event/Close Call/Near Miss Reports (UO Std 1465) SH&C Near Miss Reporting Procedure (SH&C Procedure 208) 	Establish Multi Organization Team(s) to review, analyze and consolidate processes; train employees; and assign a process champion
Law/Claims	 Claims Litigation Event reports on field incidents that result in damage or claims 	Formation of a Law Dept. team to analyze, trend, track safety risks and disseminate information to operations for risk mitigation
Employee	 Institutional Knowledge Compliance and Ethics Helpline 	 Knowledge management initiative to identify, preserve and centralize data and records relevant to inherent risks Campaign initiative to expand
Industry	Manufacturer Information Industry Associations	Knowledge management initiative to identify, preserve and centralize data and records relevant to potential risks; and disseminate information



Risk Drivers and Mitigation Measures

			11									ERM -	Safety - Gas T&D I	Desig	n an	d Ope	eration	ns			T.					
		Potential Specific Threats		Failure to fol Inadequate Sa Inadequate C Opn impact to Inadequate	r Maintenance t Personnel Illow practices afety Practices oper. Practices o environment ate training Maintenance erating Error	Đ	Design Deficient historical practices Missing Records Lack of expertise Inadequate Training Outdated Standards	Mat	Time o	erial & Ed dependent anufacturin Mis-applid ajor Station (c	degredati g Issues cation Incident	on	Construction Deficient historical practices Not following standards Poor App. Inst. QC Risk inherent practices	Knov C Liqu Bio	Mis-gra Inadeq wn corre protecte High lea on AC/D condense id from g cide hea	rosion Ided leak luate CP osion defe ed steel pil ak history IC interfere ate release gas produce alth concer te analysis	ence e cers	Inad Inexpe Unt Failure To	ool deficie	actices ersonnel ponse practices	Un-restraine Erosion arc Landslic Station pipin Seismic respor Fault o	Movement ded comm. mtrs bund pipelines des (177A) g design/maint see preparedness crossings crossings	Other Outside Force Inadequate facility protection Levee failure Inadequate facility security	Mgmt Decisions Mitigation pgms not completed Incorrect Funding Decisions	Gas Qua BTU excus Health hazard Damage to existin	rsions d in gas
	Legend: H - High M - Medium L - Low S - Strong A - Acceptable W - Weak	High Consequence Events (Examples)	Operating practices create environmental impact	Inadequate coordination with local First Responders leads to inadequate response after a significant event	Operations or Controller error results in major outage	Operator error over-pressurizes low pressure system	Lack of engineering or operational technical sypewas workforce retires and lead to inadequate design or incident response	Transmission rupture causes fatalities	Transmission rupture causes major outage	Station incident causes fatalities	Station incident causes major loss of service	Distribution leak causes fatalities Unknown material problems create safety issues	Directional drilled service installation through a sewer lateral causes fatalities	C rupture causes f	IC rupture cause major outage	EC rupture causes fatalities EC rupture causes major outage	EC leak causes fatalities	"At fault" trans. causes fatalities	ıult" dsbn. ca	"At fault" trans. major outage "At fault" dsbn. major outage	Seismic response inadequate	Rupture causes major outage	Vandalism causes major outage	ataliy associated with incomplete follow through	Gas quality has significant health impact	Gas quality has significant equipment impact
Pgm (P) Info (I)	Mitigation Efforts	Inherent Likelihood	М	М	М	Н	М	м	M	L	М	н м	М	L	L	н м	н			M L	н	Н	М	М	L	M
P P	1 Gas Dsbn Internal Gas Incident Review 2 GPRP 3 Copper Service Replacement Program			W	A	A						W S A					A		W					W S A		
ion Focu	4 Atmospheric Corrosion Program 5 Isolated Svcs Program 6 CP Re-survey Program											W S A					A A							S S W		
Distribut	7 Meter Protection Program 8 Reg. Station Maintenance 9 First Responder Training Program 10 Annual Relief Valve Calculation Review					A W						W							A					S A		
P	11 Gas Dsbn Integrity Mgmt Program 12 GIS Risk reports	Not implemented yet				A		W				S				A W	W							A S		
I I	13 Pipeline Patrols 14 Delta Risk Committee 15 Seismic Risk Manual							A W						A	A	A A		W		W	W A	A W A	A			
I P	16 Failure Analysis reports 17 Gas Transmission Incident Reports 18 USGS Shake Map/Scenarios			W			W	W	W	W	W					ww		W		W	A	W				
Tran d d	Gas Trans Integrity Mgmt Program Gas Transmission Risk Mgmt Program Density Surveys			W			W	A A W	A					A A A		A A A A		A W		A W	W A	W A A	W	S A		
O P	22 First Responder Training Program 23 Transmission erosion program 24 Internal Corrosion Program			A				W						A								A				A
l I g	25 Leak Reports/IGIS 26 Dig-in Overview Report 27 A1 Form							W				A		W	W \	W W	W	W	W	W A W W				S W		W
I Occuse	28 GSR/Meter Reader Observations 29 GSR response to customer leak notification 30 DIRT	response				A						S A					S		A S	A						
& Trans	31 RP 1162 - Pipeline Public Information Progra 32 Shutdown zones 33 Odorization	am		W					W			A		A		W	A			A S	W	W	A			
Dsbn	34 Supervisor in the field 35 Cathodic Protection Program 36 Controller Certification				Α	A	W	S				S		A			A	W	Ā	W A				A		
P	37 Operator Qualification (PG&E/Contractor)				Ŵ	Ä		A	A		A S A	W				W	W	W	A	W A						
S P S	Derivation Operating Procedures Facility Security Program Automated Control/Shutdown systems		8				A			S	S												A	S S	S	Α
	42 Benchmarking 43 Consultant reviews and reports 44 Technical Journals		W									W					A		S	S				S		
	45 Manufacturer Problem Notifications 46 Material Problem Reports (MPRs) 47 Near Miss Reports				S	S		W	W			S W							S	S				W S		W
	48 Stats from Safety Health and Claims 49 Industry involvement 50 Internal Audit/Review processes		A A			A	W	W	W			S A					A		S S A	S S A		W		S S	S	S A
	51 CPUC Audits 52 SCADA 53 GIS				S	A	A W	A	A W A		S	w				A	w		w	A W	A	A	S	A	S	
	54 Field feedback loop 55 New Product Testing Program (TES) 56 QA (Inspection, Acceptance Testing)				S	S		W	W			S A	W	W	W	WW	W		A	A				W		
) al	57 R&D involvement 58 Technical Information Library 59 Const. Stds/Const feedback loop						A						W													
s share	60 Leak Survey/Repair 61 Proper and Full Program Implementation 62 Training					A	W	А	Α	A	A	S A S		S W	W	S S A S			S					A		
tigatic A d	63 Operating Procedures 64 Design standards					A	W A	_		A		S					w			0	S	A		S		
P P	65 Maintenance Management/Execution 66 Clearance process/training 67 Apprenticeship Program 68 Engreence Plan			14/	W	A S	A W		^	A		A		^		W	W						A	J		
P P	68 Emergency Plan 69 Safety Program 70 Retirement Planning		A	W	14/	A	W	А	A		A							A		A A	A	A	*	A W		
P P	71 Disciplinary process 72 Design standardization/Standard units 73 Design/Standard exception process				W	A	W	W	W										A	A						
P P P	74 USA 75 Standby during excavation 76 Damage Prevention Program																	S S A A	S	S S S S A S						
P P	77 PSIP Program 78 Seismic Safety Committee 79 Life Cycle Requirements																	A	S	A S	S	S				
	80 Optimizer	Mitigated Likelihood	L	М	L	L	M	L	L	L	М	M L	M	L		M L	M	м	м	L L	м	н	L	M	L	L

	Risk Drivers		Operation	ns or Ma	intenance	,	Design Material & Equipment								Operation	truction	Ground Movement		Other Out	,	Management	
H = high M = medium L = low S = strong A = acceptable W = weak	Potential Specific Threats		Insuf Failure Inadequ Opn imp Inade Huma Incorrect Facilities r Condit Procedu Lack Limiter	fficient Pers to follow properties to follow properties after pact to enviole dequate training the man operating thin sufficient thin firms of the f	connel ractices Practices Practices Practices ronment ining enance g Error t Funding d/inspected rrected zumented roles ared to sset life dicators only. work	•	M Lack o Diff. conc Eng/es Con Lack of QA Prot Info gatt	Design In thistorical pre- issing Record- ack of expertis dequate Traini dated Standar f latest industr dittions not con at misinterprets flict in docume /QC for spec/ olems not traic nered is not ar ot adequately proper prioriti	s e ing rds y info sidered s stds. ents design/job ked aalyzed considered		Time de Man Majo	ial & Equip pendent deg ufacturing Isi flisapplication r Station Inci laterial Defec	redation sues n dent		Deficient hist Not followi Poor Api Risk inher Worker not t Inc. job/opera Improper interp Lack of QA/QC Improper Carel	orical practices ng standards b. Inst. QC ent practices ained properly ting instructions et. of requirement no completed work substitution essness r/kmanship	Seismic design preparedness		Car Metallic ob Inadequate fa	pole jects in OH acility securit g in		Miligation pgms i Incorrect Fundi Lack of accc Lack of training Improper/inconsis Lack of measure Lack of measure Lack of measure Lack of measure Info gathered is No plan to re Not matching per Improper pri
- - #30A	High Consequence Events (Examples)	ncident occurs due to lack of patrol or inspection	Identified problem is not corrected and results in an incident	Idle facility causes incident	mproper relay setting results in incident	perational error results in an incident	Approval of nadequate/substandard equipment/material results in an incident	Increased conductor load results in contact due to sag	500kV multiple tower failure	Failure causes major outage of transmission or substation	Defective equipment/material with potential to cause repeating incidents	Substation oil leak/fire results in incident	Structure deterioration results in incident	Unknown material problems	Poor workmanship causes incident	Non Conformance to standards causes incident	Inrestrained equipment causes major outage	Repeated car pole at same location	Inadequate tower guarding contributes to incident	Non-recognition of high voltage risk/danger by public	Dig in to underground cable	Major incident with incomplete follow rouch on a mitication
Minimation Efforts	Inherent Likelihood	н	H	н	н	н	.⊆ M	M	н	н	Н	M	н	н	Н	н	⊃ H	н	н	Н	н	# H
Mitigation Efforts Patrol and Inspection (D) Patrol and Inspection (T)	Likelinood	S		A			A	S	S	S	S		S			W		W	S	A A	W	A A
Infrared Inspection (T) Infrared Inspection (T)		S		A			A		5	5	S A				A	A		VV	5	A	W	W W
Equipment Testing EPCM Notification Work		A	S	S	S	A	А			A	A S				A	A A				A		W W
ETPM Notification Work Pole Test and Treat		S	S	S			ļ				S		S			A				A		W S
Pole Replacement Network Transformer Oil Test			A								A		S		A							A S
Network Transformer Pressure Test Cable Replacement			À			-					S.				Ä							S A
Idle Facilities (D) Idle Facilities (T)		W A	W	W																		W
Outage Review Process Reliability/Capacity							A S			S						W		W				A A
Station Inspection Steel Structure Replacement		S	S							S		S	S S	S			Α					S A
Street Light Maintenance Primary Neutral System Assessment		A	A				A				A					A						W W
Fire Protection Strategy Insulator Cleaning (T/D)			W							W		A										A W
Insulator Cleaning (S) Vegetation Management		S	S					S		S												A S
Const. Stds/Const feedback loop Dart/C-EDSA							S			S	S		S	S		A.		W				
ECCO Monthly Event Report (S1465) ECCO Scheduling Logging Intertie Califor	nia (eSLIC)					A				А	A		A									W
Failure Analysis Field feedback loop					<u> </u>	<u> </u>	S			S	Š		S S	A S	A	Α			<u> </u>			A
Geographic Information System (GIS) Inspection of Third Party Installations						S					W				W	A		W	A			
Insurance Reports Integrated Logging Information System (II Internal Auditing	JS)						<u> </u>				W			W				A	<u> </u>			Α
Internal Auditing Material Problem Reports (MPRs) New Product Testing (TLS)							A			A	A			Α	Ä	A						W
Reviews / Audits / Assessments SCADA		A	S			A										W						
SH&C Near Miss Reports CDF citations		A	A			Ä	A	S														S
Claims Legal Function		A	A				Α								A	A		A	A	W		S
Local Law Enforcement Riskmaster Event Reports				W			W				A			W				W	A	W		
CPUC Reports Environmental Spill Reports		A A	A A				A						S	S		A			А			S
FERC Incident Reports - CPUC/D.O.T.																		W		W		W A
Independent System Operator (ISO) Regulatory Audits		A	A			A A							S									A
Reportable Workplace Injuries (Cal/OSHA Compliance & Ethics Hotline (Safety Issu	es)																					W W
Employee Forums, e.g. PG&E Tomorrow Institutional Knowledge							W															
Community Forums Customer Complaints																						W A
J.D. Power Surveys Media Reports: Radio, Newspapers, TV Shareholder Meetings																						W
Shareholder Meetings Benchmarking External Assessments		A					А															W A
Industry Associations - Electric Manufacturer Problem Notifications							S				A			Α								S
Technical Journals Proper and Full Process Implementation		S	S				А				Ŵ			W								A
Apprenticeship Program Training (Initial and Annual Refresher)			S		S	A S	S			S	S		S	S	S S	S S		W				
Supervisor in the Field Operating Procedures			S		S	A S	A								A	A		W				A
UO Standards/Guidelines/Bulletins Design standards					S			S	S S		S	S S	S		S S	S S	A S	W	S		S	S
OM&C Work Procedures Maintenance Management/Execution/Sta	ndards	A S	S		S	S	A		S				S		Š	S A						
Clearance process/training Safety Program		S	A		S A	S A	A						S		A	A						A
Disciplinary process R&D involvement		Α	A	147	A	A	А								W	W		147				
Planning, Estimating, Mapping Process Technical Information Library				W			A	A							A	S A.		W				
Design standardization/Standard units USA							A									Α.	S				S	
Stand by during excavation (T) Optimizer																			<u> </u>		S	W
Program Management QA (Compliance Audit)		S A	S A	W			А					S		A		A			A		S	S A
Pre/Post Job Checklist QC Work Verification Connector Penlagoment		S	A								s				A A A	A A						
Connector Replacement Old Insulator Replacement Manufacturer Evaluation / Plant QC Chec	,	8	S				A				A				A	A						
Manufacturer Evaluation / Plant QC Chec Supplier Quality Incoming and Accept. Ins Line Surveying	pect.						A	S		A	S								<u> </u>			
Line Surveying Pole Location Guide																		W	<u> </u>	W	A	
Public Education, Bill Inserts, etc																						

	ERM - Gas & Electric T&D Safety - Emergency Response																	
	Threat Families		k of Av		Respo		F	ailure o	of	•	ck of E		•	Acces				
	Specific Threats		e do no	ot sign-ı	up for d		Phones overloaded during earthquake			Contact information with outside agencies is out of date.				Wildland fire prevents access to substation.				
	High Consequence Events	Lack of Troublemen	Lack of Electric Crews	Lack of Substation Personnel	Lack of Gas Servicemen	Lack of Gas Crews	Failure of SCADA	Failure of Telephones	Failure of Radios	Lack of Emergency Plans	Lack of ER Training	Lack of Agency Coordination	Lack of Timely Notification to PG&E	Road Closures	G & E Distribution Facilities	Substation Facilities	G & E Transmission Facilities	
Mitigation Efforts	Inherent Likelihood / Risk	H	М	М	М	М	М	М	М	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	
1 Resource Staffing Plans	LIKEIIIIOOU / KISK	А	A	A	A	A	IVI	IVI	IVI	A	W		П	П	П	П	П	
2 Rotating Shifts/ 24X7X365 Coverage (Call Cent	ers/Control Centers)												S					
3 Emergency Call Out Procedures (Union Contrac	t)	Α	Α	Α	S	Α				Α								
4 Back-up Communications Systems (Radios, Pho	ones)						W	S	S				S					
5 Electric Emergency Plan (EEP)		S	S	S						S	W	S	S	Α				
6 General Order 166										A	Α	A	A					
7 QAS Standards										A	Α	A	Α					
Operating Procedures (Fire Index Areas) Operating Procedures (S1466 & S1402)							Α	Α	Α	A	Α	Α		Α	A	Α	Α	
10 Emergency Plans submitted to CAISO													Α					
11 Coordination with Local Agencies										S	Α	S	S	S				
12 Coordination with Local Media										A	A	A	A	A				
13 Operation of Protective Relays / SCADA Contro		Α	Α	Α			Α	Α	Α				S	Α	Α	Α	Α	
14 Back-up Generators																		
15 Gas Emergency Plans	<u> </u>				S	S				S	S	S	S	Α				
16 Emergency Shut-off Valves					Α	Α							Α					
17																		
18																		
19			<u> </u>			L												

Assessment of Effectiveness of Mitigation Action to the Risk Issue

S - Strength; A - Acceptable; W - Weakness

Mitigated Likelihood / Risk	I	М	L	L	L	M	M	M	M	I	L	L	M	M	М	M	
Overall Residual Risk		M			М			Ι	Л			N	1				



Effectiveness Evaluation

Evaluation of Gas T&D Program Effectiveness

Row	, 0	Documented Process? (Standard or Code ref.)	Evaluation & analysis of each event performed?	Trending of the data performed?	Disseminated to Operations?	Is the process tracked?	Is the process regularly re- evaluated?	Effectiveness	Value
2	GPRP	Υ	Υ	Υ	N	Υ	Y	Α	Н
3	Copper Replacement Program (subset of GPRP)	Y	Υ	Υ	N	N	N	Α	Н
5	Isolated Svcs Program							W	L
6	CP Re-survey Program							Α	L
8	Annual Reg Stn Maintenance	Υ	Υ	N	N	N	N	Α	Н
9	Distribution First Responder Training	N	Y - Tabletop	N	Υ	Υ	N	W	Н
10	Annual Relief Calculations	Υ	Υ	N	N	N	Y	Α	Н
11	Gas Dsbn Integrity Mgmt Program								
18	USGS Shake Map/Scenarios	RMI-04??	Υ	No	Y (pending)	Y	?	S - Transmission only	M
19	Trans. Int. Mgmt	Y - RMP-06	Υ	Υ	N	Υ	Y	Α	Н
20	Gas Trns Rsk Mgmt Prg	Partly Y-RMP-01	Υ	Υ	N	Υ	Υ	А	M
23	Transmission erosion program	N	Υ	N	N	Y	N	А	M
24	Internal Corrosion Prgm	Partly Y-RMP-10 (pending)/ RP 4332- Removal and Control of liquids from Gas Pipelines etc	Y	Y	No for RMP-10/Yes for RP 4332	Y	Y	W (still being developed-once done, A for xmission lines)	М
32	ShutDown Zones	S5000	N	N	Y	?	Υ	W	M
	Odorization	S-4350	Υ	N	Y	Y	Y	S	Н
35	Cathodic Protection Program	Gas Std O-16	N	N	Y	Υ	Y	S	Н
36	Controller Certification	Υ	Υ	Υ	N	Υ	Υ	Α	Н
37	Operator Qualification (PG&E/Contractor)	Y	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	N	W	M
38	CBM Data	Y - Documented Program (no std)	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Y - ongoing by CBM supervisor	S - limited to gas compressors	Н
39	Operating Procedures	Υ	N/A	N/A	Υ	N/A	Y - informal	Α	Н
40	Facility Security Program	Y - S4050	Υ	N	Υ	N/A	Y	Α	M
41	Automated Control/Shutdown systems	Document	Υ	Y - for compressor shutdowns	Y	N	Y - as part of project eng process	3	н
60	Leak Survey & Repair	S-4110	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	S	H
61	Proper and Full Program Implementation							А	н
	M&C Apprenticeship	Υ	Υ	N	N	N	Y	A	Н
63	Operating Procedures		Υ		Y		Y	A	Н
	Design standards		Υ		Y	Υ	Y	А	Н
	Maintenance Management/Execution		Υ	N	Y	Y	Y	Α	Н
66	Clearance process/training		Υ	N	Y	Y	Y	A	M
67	Apprenticeship Program						,,	A	M
68	Emergency Plan		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A M (little tree elie ele	Н
	Design Standard Exception Process	Exists for joint trench Don't know if anywhere else	Υ	N	Y	Υ	Y	W (little trending or tracking of data so we can't say where all the exceptions are)	М
74	USA	Y-S4412	N	N	Y	Υ	Y	S	Н
	Standby During excavaton	Guideline 11413	N	N	Y	Υ	Y	S	Н
76	Damage Prevention Program	N	N	Limited	Limited	N	N	W	Н

QC Work Verification

Line Surveying

Pole Location Guide

Connector Replacement

Old Insulator Replacement

Manufacturer Evaluation / Plant QC Check

Supplier Quality Incoming and Accept. Inspect.

Evaluation of Electric T&D Program Effectiveness

			Risk					I	
			Evaluation &	Risk	Disseminated to	Process	Process	Effectiveness of	Value of
Key Programs	Process	Documented	Analysis	Trending	Operations	Tracking	Evaluation	Process	Process
Patrol and Inspection (D)	Yes	S2301	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High
Patrol and Inspection (T)	Yes	S1001	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High
nfrared Inspection (D)	Yes	G12022	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
nfrared Inspection (T)	Yes	ETPM Manual	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
ine Equipment	Yes	S2302	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
EPCM Notification Work (D)	Yes	S2301	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
ETPM Notification Work (T)	Yes	S1001	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
Pole Test and Treat	Yes	S2325	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High
Pole Replacement	Yes	S2325	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Network Transformer Oil Test	Yes	Being Drafted						Acceptable	High
Network Transformer Pressure Test	Yes	Being Drafted	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
Cable Replacement	Yes Yes	S0406	Yes	No No	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Acceptable Weak	Medium
dle Facilities (D) dle Facilities (T)	Yes	\$2459 \$1003	Yes Yes	No	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium Medium
Outage Review Process	Yes	\$1003 \$2010	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
Reliability/Capacity	Yes	S0460	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
Station Inspection	Yes	Sub. M&C Manual	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High
Steel Structure Replacement	Yes	IB0205	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
Street Light Maintenance	Yes	S2309	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Weak	Low
JG on Radial PN Taps	Yes	IB2003-10B	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Acceptable	High
Fire Protection Strategy	Yes	G13181	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
nsulator Cleaning (T/D)	Yes	S2404	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Weak	Medium
nsulator Cleaning (Y/D)	Yes	S2405	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Strong	High
/egetation Management	Yes	Department	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High
		2 oparanona		.10		. 00		o.co.ig	9
Other Processes, Procedures, etc	_								
Proper and Full Process Implementation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Acceptable	High
Apprenticeship Program	Yes	HR	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
raining (Initial and Annual Refresher)	Yes	HR	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
Supervisor in the Field	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Acceptable	High
Operating Procedures	Yes	S1466	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Acceptable	High
JO Standards/Guidelines/Bulletins	Yes	S0500	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Acceptable	High
Design standards	Yes	Manuals	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Strong	High
DM&C Work Procedures	Yes	OM&C Manual	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Strong	High
Substation M&C Procedures	Yes	Sub. M&C Manual	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Strong	High
Maint Management/Execution/Standards	Yes	O&M Manuals	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Strong	High
Clearance process/training	Yes	S1403	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
Safety Program	Yes Yes	USP22 HR	No No	No No	Yes No	No No	No Yes	Acceptable Acceptable	High Medium
Disciplinary process R&D involvement	Yes No	No	No No	No	No No	No	No Yes	Weak	Low
Planning, Estimating, Mapping Process	No No	No No	No No	No No	No No	No	No No	Acceptable	Medium
Flanning, Estimating, Mapping Process Fechnical Information Library	Yes	TDM	No No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No Yes	Acceptable	Medium
		INU	INU					•	
Design standardization/Standard units		64412	No	N ₀					
Design standardization/Standard units JSA	Yes	S4412	No No	No No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Strong	High High
Design standardization/Standard units USA Stand by during excavation (T)	Yes Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Strong	High
Design standardization/Standard units JSA Stand by during excavation (T) Optimizer	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes	No Yes	No No	No Yes	Yes Yes	No Yes	Strong Acceptable	High Medium
Design standardization/Standard units USA Stand by during excavation (T)	Yes Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Strong	High

IB QA1-2005

Doc.028852

Doc. 022088

No

SQI Dept

Est. Design Manual

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Weak

Acceptable

Acceptable

Acceptable

Acceptable

Strong

Weak

Medium

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

High

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

| Public Education, Bill Inserts, etc | No | Weak | Medium |
|-------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|--------|

Evaluation of Emergency Response Program Effectiveness

Row	Key Programs	Documented Process? (Standard or Code ref.)	Evaluation & analysis of each event performed?	Trending of the data performed?	Disseminated to Operations?	Is the process tracked?	Is the process regularly re- evaluated?	Effectiveness	Value
1	Resource Staffing Plans	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
2	Rotating Shifts/ 24X7X365 Coverage (Call Centers/Control Centers)	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
3	Emergency Call Out Procedures (Union Contract)	Yes / Union Contract	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
4	Back-up Communications Systems (Radios, Phones)	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Weak	Medium
5	Electric Emergency Plan (EEP)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Low
6	General Order 166	Yes / GO 166	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
7	QAS Standards	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Acceptable	Low
8	Operating Procedures (Fire Index Areas)	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Acceptable	Low
9	Operating Procedures (S1466 & S1402)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
10	Emergency Plans submitted to CAISO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Low
11	Coordination with Local Agencies	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Weak	High
12	Coordination with Local Media	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Weak	Low
13	Operation of Protective Relays / SCADA Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Acceptable	High
14	Back-up Generators	No	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Medium
15	Gas Emergency Plans	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
16	Emergency Shut-off Valves	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High

Evaluation of Key Information Source Effectiveness

				The state of the s	Event						
					Evaluation &		Disseminated to	Process	Process	Effectiveness	Value of
	Sources	Process	Documented	Process Champion	Analysis	Risk Trending	Operations	Tracking	Evaluation	of Process	Process
	A1 - Dig-in Forms	Yes	UO Std. 4110	Chris Warner	Somewhat	No	No	No	Yes	Weak	Low
1	Construction Standards/Feedback Loop	Yes	DOCTr	Greg Thwing	No	No	Non-Standardized	Yes	No	Weak	Medium
1		Yes	DART Manual	Ferne Collins	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Weak	Medium
1	DART/C-EDSA		No No		Somewhat	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Weak	
	Dig-in Overview Report	Yes		Dave Powell							Low
1	ECCO Monthly Event Report	Yes	UO Std. 1465	Mike Malloy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Weak	Medium
1	ECCO Scheduling Logging Intertie California (eSLIC)	Yes	SLIC User Manual	Mike Malloy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
1	Event/Close Call/Near Miss Reports-Electric	Yes	UO Std. 1465	Mike Malloy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Weak	High
s l	Failure Analysis	No	No	None	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	High
Ö	Field Feedback Loop	No	No	None	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Medium
erat	Gas Distribution Incident Reports	Yes	PUI Attachment 1	Boris Andino	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Medium
ö	Gas Transmission Incident Reports	Yes	Gas Info Bulletin 199	Jeff Carroll	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Acceptable	Medium
_	Geographic Information System (GIS)	Yes	MapGuide	Susan Chwistek	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
Ë	Inspection of Third Party Installations	Yes	Green Book; Exhibit 16	Project and Technical Services	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Medium
鱼	Insurance Reports	Yes	No	Hudson Martin	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	No	Weak	Medium
	Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS)	Yes	Operating Center Manual	Kathy Bradshaw	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
1	Internal Auditing	Yes	Yes	Stephen Cairns	Yes	Non-Standardized	Yes-higher levels	Yes	External QA	Acceptable	High
	Leak Reports	Yes	UO Std. 4110	Pam Johnson	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
1	Material Problem Reports (MPRs)	Yes	UO Std. 2333	Kevin Tasselmyer	Yes	Non-Standardized	Yes	No	No	Weak	High
1	New Product Testing Program (TLS)	Yes	No	Dave Bradley	Yes	No	Indirectly	Yes	No	Strong	Medium
1	Reviews / Audits /Assessments	Yes	Yes	Bob Daniels/Boris Andino	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
	SCADA, Gas and Electric	Yes	Various Emergency Plans	Gary Chrisco/Steve Calvert	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
1	SH&C Near Miss Reports	Yes	SH&C Procedure 208	Scott Roesener	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Weak	High
	CDF Citations	Yes	No	Lise Jordan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Acceptable	High
E.	Claims	Yes	No	Barbara Clement	Case-by-Case	Non-Standardized	Non-Standardized	Case-by-Case	No	Acceptable	Medium
Ca	Litigation	No	No*	Stephen Schirle	Case-by-Case	Non-Standardized	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Medium
>	Local Law Enforcement	Yes	CMS	Michael Peterson	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
Ľ	Riskmaster Event Reports	Yes	No	Mark Sweeney	Case-by-Case	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Weak	Medium
	CPUC Reports	Yes	Yes	Bob Daniels/Boris Andino	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
1	Environmental Spill Reports	Yes	Yes	Rex Bell	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
2	FERC	No	No	Stephen Metague	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Low
Regulatory	Incident Reports - CPUC/D.O.T.	Yes	UO Std. 4413	Boris Andino	No	No	Yes (high level)	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
nge	Independent System Operator (ISO)	Yes	M&O inspection processes	Gregg Lemler/Kris Buchholz	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
ž	Regulatory Audits	Yes	Yes	Bob Daniels/Boris Andino	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	Medium
1	Reportable Workplace Injuries (Cal/OSHA, CPUC)	Yes	USP 22	Mark Hughes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Weak	Low
_		+			1	+	+		+		+
уее	Compliance and Ethics Helpline (Safety Issues)	Yes	Yes	Ed Mah	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Weak	Low
Employee	Employee Forums, e.g. PG&E Tomorrow	No	No	None	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Low
ᇤ	Institutional Knowledge	Informal	No	Various	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Medium
	ū	No	No	None	No	No	No	No	No	Acceptable	
	Community Forums									'	Low
o l	Customer Complaints	Yes Yes	Yes*	Lavern Mitchell Al Torres	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Acceptable Acceptable	Medium Medium
Public	J.D. Power Surveys Media Reports: Radio, Newspapers, TV	No	No	None	No	Yes No	Yes Non-Standardized	Yes No	Yes No	Weak	Low
4	media reports. radio, newspapers, i v	INU	INO		INU	INU	INOIT-Statituatuized	INU	INU	vvcdk	LOW
1	Shareholder Meetings	Yes	No	Corporate Secretary/Responsible Officer	No	No	Yes	No	No	Acceptable	Low
	•	NI-	NI-		NI-	NI-	NI-	NI-	NI-	\A/I-	NA - divisor
	Benchmarking	No	No	Dan Pearson	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Medium
	External Assessments	No	No	None	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Weak	Medium
	Industry Associations - Electric	No	No	Various	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Acceptable	Medium
itry	Industry Associations - Gas Pipeline	No	No	Various	No	No	Non-Standardized	No	No	Acceptable	Medium
dus	Industry Associations - Gas Station	No	No	Dan Menegus	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Low
<u>ة</u>	Industry Intelligence	Yes	Yes	Julia Murphy	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Acceptable	High
	Manufacturer Manuals	No	No	None	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	High
1	mandacturer mandais	1									
	Manufacturer Problem Notifications	No	No	None	No	No	No	No	No	Weak	Medium

^{*} Process under design and implementation

ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (ERM-C) Meeting Minutes and Commitments

Meeting Date: January 26, 2007

Attendees:

Committee Members: Peter A. Darbee Standing Guests: Hudson Martin Kent M. Harvey Jon Frisch

Christopher P. Johns Thomas B. King

Bill T. Morrow Hyun Park Guests: Jeff Butler, Energy Delivery Roy Kuga, Energy Supply

Fong Wan,

Energy Procurement

Lise Jordan,

Resource Strategy & Initiative Management

Todd Strauss,

Energy Policy, Planning &

Analysis

Martin Wyspianski, Renewable Supply

Absent: None

Agenda Topics:

- 1. ERM Status Update
- 2. Gas and Electric Transmission and Distribution (T&D) System Safety Risk
- 3. Natural Gas Supply Risk

The following is a summary of the Enterprise Risk Management Committee (ERM-C) meeting held on January 26, 2007.

1. ERM Status Update

A summary of the status of the risks being evaluated in the Enterprise Risk Management process was reviewed by Mr. Harvey and Mr. Martin.

2. Gas and Electric Transmission and Distribution (T&D) System Safety Risk

A discussion of the risk that a condition associated with the gas or electric transmission or distribution system could cause an event with significant safety risk to employees or the public was presented by Mr. Jeff Butler and Ms. Lise Jordan. In addition to the action items incorporated into the presentation materials (provided previously to participants), the following additional items were identified for the Gas and Electric T&D ERM Team's action:

Action Item: Acceleration of the "copper service initiative" is to be managed by Mr. Robert Howard under Mr. Butler's direction. Additional details about this initiative are to be presented to Mr. Darbee when they have been finalized.

3. Natural Gas Supply Risk

A discussion of the natural gas supply risk was presented by Mr. Wan, Mr. Kuga, Mr. Strauss and Mr. Wyspianski in executive session.